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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Loya appeals from his judgment of conviction after a jury found him
guilty of battery on a law enforcement officer and possession of methamphetamine.  He
received an aggregate unified sentence of twelve years, with three and one-half years
fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Loya asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
appealing to the jury’s passions and prejudices when it bolstered the testimony of the
State’s witnesses during voir dire and it made comments at closing argument to
engender sympathy for law enforcement.  Mr. Loya also asserts that the district court
erred in admitting I.R.E. 404(b) information that was more prejudicial than probative,
and that he was denied his right to due process because of a fatal variance between the
charging document and the jury instructions.  Mr. Loya asserts that even if this Court
finds that the errors individually were harmless, they cumulatively deprived him of his
right to a fair trial.  Mr. Loya further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of
the district court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts, and the
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the
additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that the jury
instruction raised as Issue #3 in Mr. Loya’s Appellant’s Brief was not erroneous but was
simply putting the correct instruction in “past tense.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.16.)
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Loya’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES1
1. Did the State violate Mr. Loya’s right to a fair trial by committing multiple acts of
prosecutorial misconduct which appealed to the jury’s passions and prejudices?
2. Did the district court err in allowing reference to Mr. Loya’s past incarceration
despite the fact that such evidence was more prejudicial than probative?
3. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of
battery on a law enforcement officer?
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence?
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Loya’s Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion?
1 In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Loya fully addressed Issues #1, 2, 4, and 5, and further
argument in response to the State’s arguments made in the Respondent’s Brief is not




The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of Battery
On Law Enforcement
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the knowledge elements of battery on law
enforcement. The Information alleged that the State must prove that Mr. Loya willfully
and unlawfully used force or violence upon Justin Cyr by striking him, “where the
defendant knew or had reason to know that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (Trial
Tr., p.138, Ls.15-20; R., pp.37, 81, 94.)  However, the elements instruction expanded
the requisite knowledge Mr. Loya was required to have by expanding the Information to
find the defendant, “knew or reasonably should have known that Justin Cyr was a police
officer.”  (Trial Tr., p.292, Ls.1-2; R., p.145) (emphasis added).  The instruction thus
added a negligence option by which the jury could have found Mr. Loya guilty.  Because
the jury instruction lessened the State’s burden of proof as alleged in the Information
(R., pp.37, 81, 94), the italicized language created a fatal variance.
The State claims that the difference in the language between the statute and the
jury instruction is simply the conversion “of the statutory language to past tense.”
(Respondent’s Brief, p.16.)  However, this is a fallacy.  The effect of modifying the
instruction alters the burden of proof.  Instead of determining whether the defendant, at
the time he committed the act upon the officer, “knew or had reason to know” that the
officer was an officer, in asking the jury to find whether the defendant (knowing what we
know now) “reasonably should have known” that the officer was an officer, the jury was
being asked to second guess the knowledge of the defendant, in hindsight.  The
Information required a subjective intent, that Mr. Loya “knew or had reason to know
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[based on the information he had at the time of the act]”, but the jury was instructed that
it could convict Mr. Loya if it found that he “reasonably should have known” that Officer
Cyr was a police officer, which is an objective, negligence standard.  Similar to the
Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, where knowledge that the assailed
person is a police officer is an essential element of the offense, a jury instruction which
allowed the jury to convict him even if he did not actually know the officer was an officer
is improper, as the jury may find he should have known and is equally culpable as if he
did know—a negligence standard. See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 241 (1999)
(holding that knowledge that one is in possession of the controlled substance is an
essential element of possession of a controlled substance and the jury instruction that
Blake “should have known” he possessed methamphetamine allowed the jury to convict
him using a negligence standard).
The State’s position, that the language was simply a tense change, is untenable
as it would lower the burden of proof such that the jury would be asked to second guess
the knowledge of the defendant, in hindsight, in order to determine if the defendant
(knowing what we know now) “reasonably should have known” that the officer was an
officer.  The State cited to no authority for its conclusion; however, we know:  1) the
district court did not instruct the jury using the standard pattern jury instruction for
battery on certain personnel; and 2) the Idaho Supreme Court held that the same
knowledge of law enforcement language was correct in State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214
(2000).
Here, the jury instruction given was a non-standard jury instruction.  Idaho
Criminal Jury Instruction 1212B requires, “the defendant knew or had reason to know
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[name of victim] was [a] [an] [name of position].”  The Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions
jury instructions are presumed correct. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647 (1998).
Trial courts should follow the pattern jury instructions as closely as possible to avoid
creating unnecessary grounds for appeal.  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 (2010).
In State v. Page, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed a similar issue regarding
the State’s burden of proof as to the requirement that the jury find that the person
harmed was a police officer.  135 Idaho 214 (2000).  Mr. Page asserted on appeal that
the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof which required the jury to find
the person harmed was a police officer. Id. at 220.  The jury instruction at issue read as
follows:
If you find the defendant guilty, you must next consider whether the state has
proven both of the following:
(1) at the time of the offense, Christopher M. Rogers was a peace officer, and
(2) the defendant knew or had reason to know Christopher M. Rogers was a
peace officer.
You must indicate on the verdict form whether or not both of the above
circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.  (emphasis added).  The Idaho Supreme Court held, “Reading the instructions as a
whole, it is clear that the jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof.  The jury
was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Page knew Rogers was a police
officer.” Id., 135 Idaho at 221.  While the facts in Page were different in that the charge
was aggravated assault and the fact that the officer was an officer was determined by
the jury but used as a sentencing enhancement, the same standard should be applied.
  The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document
as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime charged.
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State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 147 (2007).  If they do not, there can be a fatal
variance between the jury instructions and the charging document. State v. Folk, 151
Idaho 327, 342 (2011); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476 (Ct. App. 2013).  It was apparent
from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Loya based on a negligence
standard if it found he reasonably should have known Officer Cyr was law enforcement.
This mental state is different from that with which Mr. Loya was originally charged.
Further, the prosecutor, while discussing the elements of battery on law
enforcement during voir dire, specifically told the jury that if it “prove[d] that the
defendant punched Officer Cyr in the line of duty, that that’s enough for the jury to find
him guilty of that charge.”  (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.15-20.)  The jury was left with the
impression that it could convict Mr. Loya simply for punching Officer Cyr while the officer
was engaged in police work, even if Mr. Loya had no knowledge of Officer Cyr’s
employment at the time of the altercation.
Because giving this instruction violated Mr. Loya’s right to due process, and
because he meets all three prongs of Idaho’s fundamental error test, Mr. Loya’s
conviction for battery on law enforcement must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Loya respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand
to the district court for a new trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Loya requests that his sentences
be reduced or altered to be served concurrently.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2017.
___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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